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ABSTRACT
Until recently, social media was seen to promote democratic dis-
course on social and political issues. However, this powerful com-
munication platform has come under scrutiny for allowing hostile
actors to exploit online discussions in an attempt to manipulate
public opinion. A case in point is the ongoing U.S. Congress inves-
tigation of Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election campaign,
with Russia accused of, among other things, using trolls (malicious
accounts created for the purpose of manipulation) and bots (auto-
mated accounts) to spread misinformation and politically biased
information. In this study, we explore the effects of this manipu-
lation campaign, taking a closer look at users who re-shared the
posts produced on Twitter by the Russian troll accounts publicly dis-
closed by U.S. Congress investigation. We collected a dataset with
over 43 million elections-related posts shared on Twitter between
September 16 and October 21, 2016 by about 5.7 million distinct
users. This dataset included accounts associated with the identified
Russian trolls. We use label propagation to infer the ideology of all
users based on the news sources they shared. This method enables
us to classify a large number of users as liberal or conservative
with precision and recall above 90%. Conservatives retweeted Rus-
sian trolls about 31 times more often than liberals and produced
36 times more tweets. Additionally, most retweets of troll content
originated from two Southern states: Tennessee and Texas. Using
state-of-the-art bot detection techniques, we estimated that about
4.9% and 6.2% of liberal and conservative users respectively were
bots. Text analysis on the content shared by trolls reveals that they
had a mostly conservative, pro-Trump agenda. Although an ide-
ologically broad swath of Twitter users were exposed to Russian
Trolls in the period leading up to the 2016 U.S. Presidential election,
it was mainly conservatives who helped amplify their message.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Social media have helped foster democratic conversation about
social and political issues: from theArab Spring [31], to OccupyWall
Street movements [16, 17] and other civil protests [30, 55], Twitter
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and other social media platforms appeared to play an instrumental
role in involving the public in policy and political conversations by
collectively framing the narratives related to particular social issues,
and coordinating online and off-line activities. The use of digital
media for political discussions during presidential elections was
examined by many studies, including the past four U.S. Presidential
elections [1, 8, 12, 20, 21], and other countries like Australia [11, 29],
and Norway [24]. Findings that focused on the positive effects of
social media, such as increasing voter turnout [10] or exposure to
diverse political views [7] contributed to the general praise of these
platforms as a tool for promoting democracy and civic engagement
[22, 36, 49, 52, 53].
However, concerns regarding the possibility of manipulating
public opinion and spreading political misinformation or fake news
through social media were also raised early on [33]. These effects
were later documented by several studies [9, 15, 23, 25, 27, 46, 50, 56].
Social media have been proven as effective tools to influence in-
dividuals’ opinions and behaviors [4–6, 13, 14] and some studies
even evaluated the current tools to combat misinformation [42].
Computational tools, like troll accounts and social bots, have been
designed to perform such type of influence operations at scale, by
cloning or emulating the activity of human users while operating
at much higher pace (e.g., automatically producing content fol-
lowing a scripted agenda) [26, 34, 38, 54] – however, it should be
noted that bots have been also used, in some instances, for positive
interventions [40, 47].
Early accounts of the adoption of bots to attempt manipulate
political communication with misinformation started in 2010, dur-
ing the U.S. midterm elections, when social bots were employed to
support some candidates and smear others; in that instance, bots
injected thousands of tweets pointing to Web sites with fake news
[45]. Similar cases were reported during the 2010 Massachusetts
special election [39] – these campaigns are often referred as to
Twitter bombs, or political astroturf. Unfortunately, oftentimes
determining the actors behind these operations was impossible
[26, 35]. Prior to this work, only a handful of other operations
were linked to some specific actors [56], e.g., the alt-right attempt
to smear a presidential candidate before the 2017 French election
[25]. This is because governments, organizations, and other entities
with sufficient resources, can obtain the technological capabilities
necessary to covertly deploy hundreds or thousands of accounts
and use them to either support or attack a given political target.
Reverse-engineering these strategies has proven a challenging re-
search venue [2, 19, 28, 51], but it can ultimately lead to techniques
to identify the actors behind these operations.
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Manipulation through misinformation, or “fake news,” has in
the past year gain notoriety, as a result of the 2016 U.S. presiden-
tial election [3, 32, 37, 43, 48, 57]. Data from Facebook and Twitter
show that deceptive, made-up content, marketed as political news,
was shared with millions of Americans before the 2016 election,1, 2
although only a handful of studies have examined this phenome-
non in detail [32]. One difficulty facing such studies is objectively
determining what is fake news, as there is a range of untruthful-
ness from simple exaggeration to outright lies. Beyond factually
wrong information, it is difficult to classify information as fake. We
argue that the key element in the definition of fake news is intent.
In order to label some accounts or sources of information as fake,
an intent to deceive has to be present. A malicious intent to harm
the political process and cause distrust in the political system was
evident in 2,752 now-deactivated Twitter accounts that were later
identified as being tied to Russia’s “Internet Research Agency" troll
farm. The U.S. Congress released a list of these accounts as part of
the Congress’ investigation of Russian efforts to interfere in the
2016 presidential election. Since their intent was clearly malicious,
we use messages posted by these Russian Troll accounts as a proxy
for fake news, and study their spread on Twitter to understand
the phenomenon of misinformation and its effects on the modern
political life.
In this paper, we aim to answer three crucial questions regarding
the spread of misinformation. The first question is: Does political
ideology affect who engages with the producers of fake news and
helps propagate it? Is the fake news phenomenon more pronounced
among liberals or conservatives, or is it evenly spread across the
political spectrum? Second, how active were bots in spreading
fake news, and where on the political spectrum was this phenom-
enon more prevalent? Last, did the fake news phenomenon have
geographical component, with users located within some states par-
ticipating in the consumption and propagation of misinformation
more than others?
We collected Twitter data over a period of few weeks in the
months leading up to the election. By continuously polling the Twit-
ter Search API for relevant, election-related content using hashtag-
and keyword-based queries, we obtained a dataset of over 43 mil-
lion tweets generated by about 5.7 million distinct users between
September 16 and October 21, 2016. We were able to successfully
determine the political ideology of most of the users using label
propagation on the retweet network with precision and recall ex-
ceeding 90%. Next, using advanced machine learning techniques
developed to discover social bots [19, 26, 51] on users who engaged
with Russian trolls, we found that bots existed among both liberal
and conservative users (although it is worthy to note that most of
these users are conservative and pro-Trump). We performed text
analysis on the content Russian trolls disseminated, and found that
they were mostly concerned with conservative causes and were
spreading pro-Trump material. Additionally, we offer an extensive
geospatial analysis of tweets across the United States, showing that
it is, as expected, proportionate to the states’ population size.
1https://blog.twitter.com/official/en_us/topics/company/2017/
Update-Russian-Interference-in-2016--Election-Bots-and-Misinformation.html
2https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/oct/30/
facebook-russia-fake-accounts-126-million
1.1 Research Questions
Our work attempts to characterize users who engaged with Russian
trolls by resharing their messages in the period leading to the 2016
US Presidential election. These interactions serve as a proxy for
fake news consumption. Specifically, we examine the following
questions:
• What was the role of the users’ political ideology?
• How many of these accounts were bots, and how was bot
activity distributed among liberal and conservative sides?
• What was the geographic location of the users who engaged
with Russian Trolls? Did trolls especially succeed in specific
areas of the US?
1.2 Summary of Contributions
Our findings can be summarized as follows:
• We proposed a novel way of measuring the production and
consumption of fake news through the analysis of activities
of manipulative accounts (Russian Trolls) on Twitter in the
run-up period to the election.
• Using a network-based machine learning method, we were
able to successfully determine the political ideology of most
of the users in our dataset, with precision and recall above
90%.
• We ran state-of-the-art bot detection analysis on users who
engaged with Russian Trolls and determined that bots were
engaged in both liberal and conservative domains (with the
caveat that the majority of the users in our dataset are con-
servative; thus, most bots were on the conservative side as
well).
• Text analysis shows that Russian trolls were mostly promot-
ing conservative causes and were, specifically, spreading
pro-Trump material.
• Weoffered a comprehensive geo-spatial analysis of the tweets.
Our comprehensive analysis indicates that although the consump-
tion and dissemination of content produced by Russian Trolls was
distributed broadly over the political spectrum, it was especially
concentrated among the conservative Twitter accounts. These ac-
counts helped amplify the misinformation produced by trolls to
manipulate public opinion during the period leading up to the 2016
U.S. Presidential election.
2 DATA COLLECTION
2.1 Twitter Dataset
We created a list of hashtags and keywords that relate to the 2016
U.S. Presidential election. The list was crafted to contain a roughly
equal number of hashtags and keywords associated with each major
Presidential candidate: we selected 23 terms, including five terms
referring to the Republican Party nominee Donald J. Trump (#don-
aldtrump, #trump2016, #neverhillary, #trumppence16, #trump), four
terms for Democratic Party nominee Hillary Clinton (#hillaryclin-
ton, #imwithher, #nevertrump, #hillary), and several terms related
to debates. To make sure our query list was comprehensive, we also
added a few keywords for the two third party candidates, including
the Libertarian Party nominee Gary Johnson (one term), and Green
Party nominee Jill Stein (two terms).
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Figure 1: Timeline of the volume of tweets (in blue) and
users (in red) generated during our observation period.
Table 1: Twitter Data Descriptive Statistics.
Statstic Count
# of Tweets 43,705,293
# of Retweets 31,191,653
# of Distinct Users 5,746,997
# of Tweets/Retweets with a Url 22,647,507
By querying the Twitter Search API at an interval of 10 seconds,
continuously and without interruptions between 15th of September
and 9th of November 2016, we collected a large dataset containing
43.7million unique tweets posted by nearly 5.7million distinct users.
Table 1 reports some aggregate statistics of the dataset while Figure
1 shows the timeline of the volume of the tweets and users during
the aforementioned period. The data collection infrastructure ran
inside an AmazonWeb Services (AWS) instance to ensure resilience
and scalability. We chose to use the Twitter Search API to make sure
that we obtained all tweets that contain the search terms of interest
posted during the data collection period, rather than a sample of
unfiltered tweets. This precaution we took avoids certain issues
related to collecting sampled data using the Twitter Stream API
that had been reported in literature [41].
2.2 Classification of Media Outlets
We classify users by their ideology based on the political leaning
of the media outlets they shared. The classification algorithm is
described later in the paper; here, we describe the methodology of
obtaining ground truth labels for these outlets.
We use lists of partisan media outlets compiled by third-party
organizations, such as AllSides3 and Media Bias/Fact Check.4 The
combined list includes 249 liberal outlets and 212 conservative out-
lets. After cross-referencing with domains obtained in our Twitter
3https://www.allsides.com/media-bias/media-bias-ratings
4https://mediabiasfactcheck.com/
(a)
(b)
Figure 2: Distribution of tweets with links to the top five (a)
liberal and (b) conservative media outlets.
dataset, we identified 190 liberal and 167 conservative outlets. We
picked five media outlets from each partisan category that appeared
most frequently in our Twitter dataset and compiled a list of users
who tweeted from these outlets. The list of media outlets/domain
names for each partisan category is reported in Table 2.
Overall, 161,907 tweets in the dataset contained a url that pointed
to one of the top-five liberal media outlets, which were tweeted by
10,636 users. For the conservative outlets, the numbers are 184,720
tweets and 7,082 users. Figures 2a and 2b show the distribution of
tweets with urls from liberal and conservative outlets respectively.
As we can see in the figures, Huffington Post and Breitbart make
up more than 60% of the total volume.
We used a polarity rule to label Twitter users as liberal or con-
servative depending on the number of tweets they produced with
links to liberal or conservative sources. In other words, if a user had
more tweets with urls to liberal sources, he/she would be labeled
liberal and vice versa. Although the overwhelmingmajority of users
include urls that are either liberal or conservative, we removed any
users that had equal number of tweets from each side 5. Our final
set of labeled users include 29,832 users.
2.3 Russian Trolls
We used a list of 2,752 Twitter accounts identified as Russian trolls
that was compiled and released by the U.S. Congress6, see Table
3 for descriptive statistics. Out of the accounts appearing on the
5We used five categories, as in left, left center, center, right center, right, to make sure
we have a final list of users who are unequivocally liberal or conservative and do
not fall in the middle. The media outlet lists for the left/right center and center were
compiled from the same sources.
6See https://www.recode.net/2017/11/2/16598312/russia-twitter-trump-twitter-
deactivated-handle-list
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Table 2: Liberal & Conservative Domain Names.
Liberal Conservative
www.huffingtonpost.com www.breitbart.com
thinkprogress.org www.thegatewaypundit.com
www.politicususa.com www.lifezette.com
shareblue.com www.therebel.media
www.dailykos.com theblacksphere.net
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics on Russian Trolls.
Value
# of Russian Trolls 2,735
# of trolls in our data 221
# of trolls wrote original tweets 85
# of original tweets 861
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the Retweet Network.
Statstic Count
# of nodes 4,678,265
# of edges 19,240,265
Max in-degree 278,837
Max out-degree 12,780
Density 8.79E-07
list, 221 exist in our Twitter dataset, and 85 of them wrote original
tweets (861 tweets). Russian trolls in our dataset retweeted 2,354
other distinct users 6,457 times. Trolls retweeted each other only
51 times.
Twitter users can choose to report their location in their profile.
Most of the self-reported locations of accounts associated with
Russian trolls were within the U.S. (some provided Russian locations
in their profile), and most of the tweets were from users who are
based in Tennessee and Texas, 49,277 and 26,489 respectively.
Russian trolls were retweeted 83,719 times, but most of these
retweets were for three troll accounts only: ‘TEN_GOP’, 49,286;
‘Pamela_Moore13’, 16,532; and ‘TheFoundingSon’, 8,755, in total
making over 89% of the times Russian trolls were retweeted. Russian
trolls were retweeted by 40,224 distinct users.
3 DATA ANALYSIS & METHODS
3.1 Retweet Network
We construct a retweet network, containing nodes (Twitter users)
with a directed link between them if one user retweeted a post
of another. Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of the retweet
network. It is a sparse networkwith a giant component that includes
4,474,044 nodes.
Table 5: Precision & Recall scores for the seed users and
hyper-partisan users test sets.
Seed Users Hyper-Partisan Users
Precision 0.91 0.93
Recall 0.91 0.93
3.2 Label Propagation
We used label propagation7 to classify Twitter accounts as liberal
or conservative. In a network-based label propagation algorithm
each node is assigned a label, which is updated iteratively based on
the labels of node’s network neighbors. In label propagation, a node
takes the most frequent label of its neighbors as its own new label.
The algorithm proceeds updating labels iteratively and stops when
the labels no longer change (see [44] for more information). The
algorithm takes as parameters (i) weights, in-degree or how many
times node i retweeted node j; (ii) seeds (the list of labeled nodes).
We fix the seeds’ labels so they do not change in the process, since
this seed list also serves as our ground truth.
We constructed a retweet network where each node corresponds
to a Twitter account and a link exists between pairs of nodes when
one of them retweets a message posted by the other. We used
the 29k users mentioned in the media outlets sections as seeds,
those who mainly retweet messages from either the liberal or the
conservative media outlets in table 2, and label them accordingly.
We then run label propagation to label the remaining nodes in the
retweet network.
To validate results of the label propagation algorithm, we applied
stratified cross (5-fold) validation to the set of 29k seeds. We train
the algorithm on 4/5 of the seed list and see how it performs on the
remaining 1/5. The precision and recall scores are around 0.91.
To further validate the labeling algorithm, we noticed that a
group of twitter accounts puts media outlet urls as their personal
link/website. We compiled a list of these hyper-partisan twitter
users who has the domain names from table 2 in the profiles and
used the same approach explained in the previous paragraph (strat-
ified 5-fold cross-validation). The precision and recall scores for the
test set for these users were around 0.93. Table 5 show the precision
and recall scores for the two validation methods we used, both
labeled more than 90% of the test set users correctly, cementing our
confidence in the performance of the labeling algorithm.
3.3 Bot Detection
Determining whether either human or a bot controls a social media
account has proven a very challenging task [26, 51]. We used an
openly accessible solution called Botometer (a.k.a. BotOrNot) [19],
consisting of both a public Web site (https://botometer.iuni.iu.edu/)
and a Python API (https://github.com/IUNetSci/botometer-python),
which allow for making this determination. Botometer is a machine-
learning framework that extracts and analyses a set of over one
thousand features, spanning content and network structure, tem-
poral activity, user profile data, and sentiment analysis to produce
a score that suggests the likelihood that the inspected account
7We used the algorithm in the Python version of the Igraph library [18]
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is indeed a social bot. Extensive analysis revealed that the two
most important classes of features to detect bots are, maybe un-
surprisingly, the metadata and usage statistics associated with the
user accounts. The following indicators provide the strongest sig-
nals to separate bots from humans: (i) whether the public Twitter
profile looks like the default one or it is customized (it requires
some human efforts to customize the profile, therefore bots are
more likely to exhibit the default profile setting); (ii) absence of
geographical metadata (humans often use smartphones and the
Twitter iPhone/Android App, which records as digital footprint
the physical location of the mobile device); and, (iii) activity sta-
tistics such as total number of tweets and frequency of posting
(bots exhibit incessant activity and excessive amounts of tweets),
proportion of retweets over original tweets (bots retweet contents
much more frequently than generating new tweets), proportion
of followers over followees (bots usually have less followers and
more followees), account creation date (bots are more likely to have
recently-created accounts), randomness of the username (bots are
likely to have randomly-generated usernames).
Botometer was trained with thousands of instances of social
bots, from simple to sophisticated, with an accuracy above 95 per-
cent [19]. Typically, Botometer yields likelihood scores above 50
percent only for accounts that look suspicious to a scrupulous analy-
sis. We adopted the Python Botometer API to systematically inspect
the most active users in our dataset. The Python Botometer API
queries the Twitter API to extract 300 recent tweets and publicly
available account metadata, and feeds these features to an ensemble
of machine learning classifiers, which produce a bot score.
To label accounts as bots, we use the fifty-percent threshold –
which has proven effective in prior studies [19] – an account is
considered to be a bot if the bot score is above 0.5.
3.4 Geo-location
There are two ways to identity the location of tweets produced
by users. One way is to collect the coordinates of the location the
tweets were sent from; however, this is only possible if users enable
the geolocation option on their Twitter accounts. The second way
is to analyze the self-reported home locations in users’ profiles. The
latter includes substantially more noise, since many people write
fictitious or imprecise locations, for example, they may identify the
state and the country they reside in, but not the city.
There were 36,351 tweets with exact coordinates in our dataset.
The distribution of tweets across the fifty states tended to be con-
centrated in the South, with Kentucky being the state with the
highest number of geolocated tweets. It is hard to know why that
is the case; besides, geo-tagged tweets in this dataset comprise less
than 0.001% of the whole dataset.
Tweets and users’ self-reported locations make up substantially
more of our dataset than geo-tagged tweets. More than 3.8 million
Twitter users provided a location in their profile, and out of those
that are intelligible and located within the US, 1.6 Million remained.
From users’ locations, we mapped over 10.5 Million tweets to some
U.S, States, as shown in Figure 3. The distribution of the tweets
and users seems to be as expected population-wise, although it is
slightly less than expected for the state of California, provided that
it is the most populous state in the nation.
Figure 3: Self-reported sources for tweets; white/non-
existing states mean no tweets/users are located within
these states.
Table 6: Breakdown of the Russian Trolls by political ideol-
ogy, with the ratio of conservative to liberal trolls.
Liberal Conservative Ratio
# of trolls 107 108 1
# of trolls w orginial tweets 15 64 4.3
# of original tweets 44 844 19
4 RESULTS
4.1 Activity of Russian Trolls
Although the predicted labels for the 215 Russian troll accounts
in our dataset is almost equally divided between liberal and con-
servative, with 107 accounts labeled as liberal and 108 labeled as
conservative, the two groups are extremely different in terms of
their activity (see table 6). While there are only 15 liberal Russian
trolls who wrote original tweets, there are 64 conservative trolls
who produced original content. Left leaning trolls wrote 44 origi-
nal tweets, while conservatives wrote 844 original tweets. Table 7
shows the top 20 stemwords from tweets of liberal and conservative
trolls respectively.
4.2 Users Engaged with Russian Trolls
Concerning the users who retweeted Russian trolls, which we call
spreaders, three key questions emerge: What is their political ideol-
ogy (liberal vs conservative)? Where are they located? How many
of them are bots?
4.2.1 Political Ideology. Spreaders tell a fascinating story (see
tables 8 & 9). There are 28,274 spreaders in our dataset that wrote
original tweets. They produced over 1.5 Million original tweets
and over 12 Million tweets and retweets, not counting the ones
from Russian trolls. Looking at the content of the top 10 users, we
can easily identify them as conservative; besides, they produced an
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Table 7: Top 20 stemmed words from the tweets of Russian
Trolls classified as liberal and conservative.
Liberal count Conservative count
trump 14 trumpforpresid 486
debat 10 trump 241
nevertrump 6 trumppence16 227
like 5 hillaryforprison2016 168
2016electionin3word 5 vote 127
elections2016 4 maga 113
imwithh 4 neverhillari 106
obama 3 election2016 102
need 3 hillari 100
betteralternativetodeb 3 hillaryclinton 85
women 3 trump2016 80
would 3 draintheswamp 50
vote 3 trumptrain 48
mondaymotiv 2 debat 48
last 2 realdonaldtrump 45
oh 2 electionday 43
thing 2 clinton 41
damn 2 makeamericagreatagain 34
see 2 votetrump 32
defeat 2 america 31
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of spreaders, i.e., users who
retweeted Russian Trolls.
Value
# of spreaders 40,224
# of times retweeted trolls 83,719
# of spreaders with original tweets 28,274
# of original tweets >1.5 Million
# of original tweets and retweets >12 Million
unreasonable amount of tweets in such a short period. In the next
paragraph we will look systematically at these users’ activities by
political leaning.
There are more than 42 thousand tweets by the liberal spreaders
and more than 1.5 million tweets by conservative ones. There are
892 liberal and 27,382 conservative spreaders. The top stemmed
words in the liberals’ tweets indicate support for Clinton, while
the conservatives’ postings openly support Trump. The top urls
for the liberals include media outlets, such as: Huffington Post and
NBC News, while conservatives tweeted from Breitbart, The Gate-
way Pundit, and Info Wars. For the profile url, liberals mostly had
social network accounts, while conservatives, besides social net-
work accounts, put “www.donaldjtrump.com” and “lyingcrooked-
hillary.com”.
4.2.2 Geospaitial Analysis. we can see in Figures 4a and 4b,
liberals’ tweets come from fewer states and some Democratic states
stand out as a major source of the tweets, such as the state of
New York. For the conservative users, the tweets come from higher
number of states (which can be just an artifact of the conservatives’
Table 9: Breakdown by political ideology of users who
spread Russian Troll content and wrote original tweets.
Liberal Conservative Ratio
# of spreaders 892 27,382 31
# of tweets >42,000 >1.5 Million 36
(a)
(b)
Figure 4: Self-reported sources for tweets for liberal users
who retweeted Russian trolls (a), and for conservatives (b);
white/non-existing states mean no tweets/users are located
within these states.
tweet volume) and prominent Republican states, such as Texas
and Florida stand out as the biggest geographic sources of the
conservatives’ tweets.
4.2.3 Bots. Using the approach explained in the Bot detection
section, wewere able to obtain bot scores for 34,160 out of the 40,224
spreaders. The number of accounts that has a bot score above 0.5
and can be considered bots are 2,126 accounts.
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Table 10: Bot Analysis on Spreaders (those with bot scores).
Liberal Conservative Ratio
# of spreaders 1,506 32,513 22
# of tweets 224,943 11,928,886 53
# of bots 75 2,018 27
# of tweets by bots 18,749 955,583 51
Answering the third question is trickier, since most of the spread-
ers are conservative (see table 10 for spreaders’ bot analysis by po-
litical ideology). But putting that aside, out of the 34,160 spreaders
with bot scores, 1,506 are liberal and 75 of them have bot scores
above 0.5, about 4.9% of the total. As for the conservatives, there
are 32,513 spreaders, with 2,018 who have bot scores more than 0.5,
representing around 6.2% of the total. In terms of tweet/retweet pro-
duction, liberal spreaders produced 224,943 tweets/retweets with
18,749 tweets/retweets by users who have a bot score above 0.5, rep-
resenting around 8.3%. For conservative spreaders, they produced
11,928,886 tweets/retweets, with 955,583 from users with bot score
more than 0.5, around 8% of the total.
Figure 5 shows the probability density of bot scores of liberal (top)
and conservative (bottom) spreaders respectively. Again, putting
the disproportionate number of liberals to conservatives aside, the
density of bot scores seem to be similar to each other, with the
majority of the users ranging from 0 to 0.6.
5 CONCLUSIONS
The dissemination of information and the mechanisms for demo-
cratic discussion have radically changed since the advent of digital
media, especially social media. Platforms like Twitter have been ex-
tensively praised for their contribution to democratization of public
discourse on civic and political issues. However, many studies have
also highlighted the perils associated with the abuse of these plat-
forms. The spread of deceptive, false and misleading information
aimed at manipulating public opinion are among those risks.
In this work, we investigated the role and effects of misinfor-
mation, using the content produced by Russian Trolls on Twitter
as a proxy for misinformation. We collected tweets posted during
the period between 16 September and 21 October 2016 related to
the U.S. presidential election using the Twitter Search API and a
manually compiled list of keywords and hashtags. We showed that
that misinformation (produced by Russian Trolls) was shared more
widely by conservatives than liberals on Twitter. Although there
were about 4 times as many Russian Trolls posting conservative
views as liberal ones, the former produced almost 20 times more
content. In terms of users who retweeted these trolls, there were
about 30 times more conservatives than liberals. Conservatives also
outproduced liberals in terms on content, at a rate of 35:1. Using
state-of-the-art bot detection method, we estimated that about 4.9%
and 6.2% of the liberal and conservative users are bots.
The spread of misinformation by malicious actors can have se-
vere negative consequences. It can enhance malicious information
and polarize political conversations, causing confusion and social
Figure 5: Distribution of the probability density of bot scores
assigned to liberal users who retweet Russian Trolls (top)
and for conservative users (bottom).
instability. Political scientists are currently investigating the conse-
quences of such phenomena [50, 56]. We plan to explore in partic-
ular the issue of how malicious information spread via exposure
and the role of peer effect. Concluding, it is important to stress
that, although our analysis unveiled the current state of the polit-
ical debate and agenda pushed by the Russian Trolls who spread
malicious information, it is impossible to account of all the ma-
licious efforts aimed at manipulation during the last presidential
election. State- and non-state actors, local and foreign governments,
political parties, private organizations, and even individuals with
adequate resources [35], could obtain operational capabilities and
technical tools to construct misinformation campaigns and deploy
armies of social bots to affect the directions of online conversations.
Therefore, future efforts will be required by the machine learning
research and social sciences communities to study this issue in
depth and develop more sophisticated detection techniques capable
of unmasking and fighting these malicious efforts.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
The authors gratefully acknowledge support by the Air Force Office of
Scientific Research (AFOSR, award number FA9550-17-1-0327). The views
and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be
interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements,
either expressed or implied, of AFOSR or the U.S. Government.
WWW’18, April 2018, Lyon, FR Adam Badawy, Emilio Ferrara, and Kristina Lerman
REFERENCES
[1] Lada A Adamic and Natalie Glance. 2005. The political blogosphere and the 2004
US election: divided they blog. In Proceedings of the 3rd international workshop
on Link discovery. ACM, 36–43.
[2] Abdulrahman Alarifi, Mansour Alsaleh, and AbdulMalik Al-Salman. 2016. Twitter
turing test: Identifying social machines. Information Sciences 372 (2016), 332–346.
[3] Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow. 2017. Social media and fake news in the
2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives 31, 2 (2017), 211–36.
[4] Sinan Aral, Lev Muchnik, and Arun Sundararajan. 2009. Distinguishing influence-
based contagion from homophily-driven diffusion in dynamic networks. Proceed-
ings of the National Academy of Sciences 106, 51 (2009), 21544–21549.
[5] Sinan Aral and Dylan Walker. 2012. Identifying influential and susceptible
members of social networks. Science 337, 6092 (2012), 337–341.
[6] Eytan Bakshy, Jake M Hofman, Winter A Mason, and Duncan J Watts. 2011.
Everyone’s an influencer: quantifying influence on twitter. In Proceedings of the
fourth ACM international conference on Web search and data mining. ACM, 65–74.
[7] Eytan Bakshy, Solomon Messing, and Lada A Adamic. 2015. Exposure to ideologi-
cally diverse news and opinion on Facebook. Science 348, 6239 (2015), 1130–1132.
[8] Marija Anna Bekafigo and Allan McBride. 2013. Who tweets about politics?
Political participation of Twitter users during the 2011gubernatorial elections.
Social Science Computer Review 31, 5 (2013), 625–643.
[9] Alessandro Bessi and Emilio Ferrara. 2016. Social bots distort the 2016 US
Presidential election online discussion. First Monday 21, 11 (2016).
[10] Robert M Bond, Christopher J Fariss, Jason J Jones, Adam DI Kramer, Cameron
Marlow, Jaime E Settle, and James H Fowler. 2012. A 61-million-person experi-
ment in social influence and political mobilization. Nature 489, 7415 (2012).
[11] Axel Bruns and Jean E Burgess. 2011. The use of Twitter hashtags in the formation
of ad hoc publics. In Proceedings of the 6th European Consortium for Political
Research (ECPR) General Conference 2011.
[12] Juliet E Carlisle and Robert C Patton. 2013. Is social media changing how we un-
derstand political engagement? An analysis of Facebook and the 2008 presidential
election. Political Research Quarterly 66, 4 (2013), 883–895.
[13] Damon Centola. 2010. The spread of behavior in an online social network
experiment. Science 329, 5996 (2010), 1194–1197.
[14] Damon Centola. 2011. An experimental study of homophily in the adoption of
health behavior. Science 334, 6060 (2011), 1269–1272.
[15] Michael Conover, Jacob Ratkiewicz, Matthew R Francisco, Bruno Gonçalves,
Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini. 2011. Political polarization on twitter.
ICWSM 133 (2011), 89–96.
[16] Michael D Conover, Clayton Davis, Emilio Ferrara, Karissa McKelvey, Filippo
Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini. 2013. The geospatial characteristics of a
social movement communication network. PloS one 8, 3 (2013), e55957.
[17] Michael D Conover, Emilio Ferrara, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro Flammini.
2013. The digital evolution of occupy wall street. PloS one 8, 5 (2013), e64679.
[18] Gabor Csardi and Tamas Nepusz. 2006. The igraph software package for complex
network research. InterJournal, Complex Systems 1695, 5 (2006), 1–9.
[19] Clayton Allen Davis, Onur Varol, Emilio Ferrara, Alessandro Flammini, and
Filippo Menczer. 2016. Botornot: A system to evaluate social bots. In Proceedings
of the 25th International Conference Companion on World Wide Web. International
World Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee, 273–274.
[20] Nicholas A Diakopoulos and David A Shamma. 2010. Characterizing debate
performance via aggregated twitter sentiment. In Proceedings of the SIGCHI
Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems. ACM, 1195–1198.
[21] Joseph DiGrazia, Karissa McKelvey, Johan Bollen, and Fabio Rojas. 2013. More
tweets, more votes: Social media as a quantitative indicator of political behavior.
PloS one 8, 11 (2013), e79449.
[22] Robin Effing, Jos Van Hillegersberg, and Theo Huibers. 2011. Social media and
political participation: are Facebook, Twitter and YouTube democratizing our
political systems? Electronic participation (2011), 25–35.
[23] Sara El-Khalili. 2013. Social media as a government propaganda tool in post-
revolutionary Egypt. First Monday 18, 3 (2013).
[24] Gunn Sara Enli and Eli Skogerbø. 2013. Personalized campaigns in party-centred
politics: Twitter and Facebook as arenas for political communication. Information,
Communication & Society 16, 5 (2013), 757–774.
[25] Emilio Ferrara. 2017. Disinformation and social bot operations in the run up to
the 2017 French presidential election. First Monday 22, 8 (2017).
[26] Emilio Ferrara, Onur Varol, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro
Flammini. 2016. The rise of social bots. Comm. of the ACM 59, 7 (2016), 96–104.
[27] Adam Fourney, Miklos Z Racz, Gireeja Ranade, Markus Mobius, and Eric Horvitz.
2017. Geographic and Temporal Trends in Fake News Consumption During the
2016 US Presidential Election. In CIKM, Vol. 17. 6–10.
[28] Carlos Freitas, Fabricio Benevenuto, Saptarshi Ghosh, and Adriano Veloso. 2015.
Reverse engineering socialbot infiltration strategies in twitter. In Proceedings of
the 2015 IEEE/ACM ASONAM. ACM, 25–32.
[29] Rachel K Gibson and Ian McAllister. 2006. Does cyber-campaigning win votes?
Online communication in the 2004 Australian election. Journal of Elections, Public
Opinion and Parties 16, 3 (2006), 243–263.
[30] Sandra González-Bailón, Javier Borge-Holthoefer, and YamirMoreno. 2013. Broad-
casters and hidden influentials in online protest diffusion. American Behavioral
Scientist 57, 7 (2013), 943–965.
[31] Sandra González-Bailón, Javier Borge-Holthoefer, Alejandro Rivero, and Yamir
Moreno. 2011. The dynamics of protest recruitment through an online network.
Scientific reports 1 (2011), 197.
[32] Andrew Guess, Brendan Nyhan, and Jason Reifler. 2018. Selective Exposure to
Misinformation: Evidence from the consumption of fake news during the 2016 U.S.
presidential campaign. Technical Report.
[33] Philip Howard. 2006. New media campaigns and the managed citizen. Cambridge.
[34] Tim Hwang, Ian Pearce, and Max Nanis. 2012. Socialbots: Voices from the fronts.
interactions 19, 2 (2012), 38–45.
[35] Bence Kollanyi, Philip N Howard, and Samuel C Woolley. 2016. Bots and automa-
tion over Twitter during the first US Presidential debate. Data Memo (2016).
[36] Brian D Loader and Dan Mercea. 2011. Networking democracy? Social media
innovations and participatory politics. Information, Communication & Society 14,
6 (2011), 757–769.
[37] Nicco Mele, David Lazer, Matthew Baum, Nir Grinberg, Lisa Friedland, Kenneth
Joseph, Will Hobbs, and Carolina Mattsson. 2017. Combating Fake News: An
Agenda for Research and Action. (2017).
[38] Johnnatan Messias, Lucas Schmidt, Ricardo Oliveira, and Fabrício Benevenuto.
2013. You followed my bot! Transforming robots into influential users in Twitter.
First Monday 18, 7 (2013).
[39] Panagiotis T Metaxas and Eni Mustafaraj. 2012. Social media and the elections.
Science 338, 6106 (2012), 472–473.
[40] Bjarke Monsted, Piotr Sapiezynski, Emilio Ferrara, and Sune Lehmann. 2017.
Evidence of complex contagion of information in social media: An experiment
using Twitter bots. PLOS ONE 12, 9 (09 2017), 1–12.
[41] Fred Morstatter, Jürgen Pfeffer, Huan Liu, and Kathleen M Carley. [n. d.]. Is
the Sample Good Enough? Comparing Data from Twitter’s Streaming API with
Twitter’s Firehose. In ICWSM. 400–408.
[42] Gordon Pennycook and David G. Rand. 2017. Assessing the Effect of “Disputed”
Warnings and Source Salience on Perceptions of Fake News Accuracy. (2017).
[43] Gordon Pennycook and David G Rand. 2017. Who falls for fake news? The
roles of analytic thinking, motivated reasoning, political ideology, and bullshit
receptivity. (2017).
[44] Usha Nandini Raghavan, Réka Albert, and Soundar Kumara. 2007. Near linear
time algorithm to detect community structures in large-scale networks. Physical
review E 76, 3 (2007), 036106.
[45] Jacob Ratkiewicz, Michael Conover, Mark Meiss, Bruno Gonçalves, Snehal Patil,
Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2011. Truthy: mapping the spread of
astroturf in microblog streams. In Proceedings of the 20th international conference
companion on World wide web. ACM, 249–252.
[46] Jacob Ratkiewicz, Michael Conover, Mark R Meiss, Bruno Gonçalves, Alessandro
Flammini, and Filippo Menczer. 2011. Detecting and Tracking Political Abuse in
Social Media. ICWSM 11 (2011), 297–304.
[47] Saiph Savage, Andres Monroy-Hernandez, and Tobias Höllerer. 2016. Botivist:
Calling volunteers to action using online bots. In 19th ACM Conference on
Computer-Supported Cooperative Work & Social Computing. ACM, 813–822.
[48] Chengcheng Shao, Giovanni Luca Ciampaglia, Onur Varol, Alessandro Flammini,
and Filippo Menczer. 2017. The spread of fake news by social bots. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1707.07592 (2017).
[49] Clay Shirky. 2011. The political power of social media: Technology, the public
sphere, and political change. Foreign affairs (2011), 28–41.
[50] Samantha Shorey and Philip N Howard. 2016. Automation, Algorithms, and
Politics / Automation, Big Data and Politics: A Research Review. International
Journal of Communication 10 (2016), 24.
[51] VS Subrahmanian, Amos Azaria, Skylar Durst, Vadim Kagan, Aram Galstyan,
Kristina Lerman, Linhong Zhu, Emilio Ferrara, Alessandro Flammini, and Filippo
Menczer. 2016. The DARPA Twitter bot challenge. Computer 49, 6 (2016), 38–46.
[52] Zeynep Tufekci. 2014. Big Questions for Social Media Big Data: Representative-
ness, Validity and Other Methodological Pitfalls. ICWSM 14 (2014), 505–514.
[53] Zeynep Tufekci and Christopher Wilson. 2012. Social media and the decision
to participate in political protest: Observations from Tahrir Square. Journal of
Communication 62, 2 (2012), 363–379.
[54] Onur Varol, Emilio Ferrara, Clayton Davis, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro
Flammini. 2017. Online Human-Bot Interactions: Detection, Estimation, and
Characterization. In ICWSM. 280–289.
[55] Onur Varol, Emilio Ferrara, Christine L Ogan, Filippo Menczer, and Alessandro
Flammini. 2014. Evolution of online user behavior during a social upheaval. In
Proceedings of the 2014 ACM conference on Web science. ACM, 81–90.
[56] Samuel C Woolley and Philip N Howard. 2016. Automation, Algorithms, and
Politics / Political Communication, Computational Propaganda, and Autonomous
Agents – Introduction. International Journal of Communication 10 (2016), 9.
[57] Savvas Zannettou, Tristan Caulfield, Emiliano De Cristofaro, Michael Sirivianos,
Gianluca Stringhini, and Jeremy Blackburn. 2018. Disinformation Warfare: Un-
derstanding State-Sponsored Trolls on Twitter and Their Influence on the Web.
arXiv:1801.09288 (2018).
